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The Use of Conditions in Foreign Relations
Legislation
THOMAS

I.

A.

BALMER*

INTRODUCTION

The very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment
to human rights. We stand for human rights because we believe
that the purpose of government is to protect the well-being of its
citizens. The world must know that in support of human rights
the United States will stand firm. We expect no quick or easy
results, but there has been significant movement toward greater
freedom and humanity in several parts of the world. Thousands
of political prisoners have been freed. The leaders of the
world-even our ideological adversaries-now see that their attitude toward fundamental human rights affects their standing in
the international community and their relations with the United
States.I

In his first State of the Union Address, President Carter
thus reaffirmed the human rights position that had played an
important part in his presidential campaign. Significantly,
Carter did not mention the role of Congress or of legislation in
the formulation of American foreign policy. Instead, he spoke
as if United States policy was the expression of a single, unified
view of the world held by the Executive, Congress, and the
general public. In practice, of course, the views of both Congress and the public frequently conflict with those of the President, even to the extent of frustrating the Executive's foreign
policy efforts.
In the area of human rights, and in foreign policy generally, the Carter administration has been attempting to fashion
* Member, Massachusetts Bar. A.B., 1974, Oberlin College; J.D., 1977, University of Chicago.
1. State of the Union Address by President Jimmy Carter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1978, § 1, at 12, col. 1. President Carter stressed human rights, but his address left
the status of that policy somewhat in doubt: It was not one of the three "goals" of U.S.
foreign policy (security, peace, economic growth and stability), id. at col. 5-6, but it
was included as one of the "purposes" of foreign policy, which were "to insure economic
justice, to advance human rights, to resolve conflicts without violence and to proclaim
our constant faith in the liberty and dignity of human beings everywhere." Id. at col.
6. Despite President Carter's concern for human rights, after one year in office he is
beginning to face criticism from both liberals and conservatives in Congress who think
he has not acted strongly enough in using U.S. influence to advance human rights. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 14, col. 2.
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a workable relationship with a Congress newly active in foreign
affairs. The contours of that relationship are just now beginning to emerge.
Although Congress' assertion of its role in foreign relations
can be contrasted with earlier lassitude, the question of the
respective foreign policy roles of Congress and the Executive is
as old as the nation itself, and is in a state of continual flux.
When George Washington proclaimed American neutrality in
the war between France and Great Britain in 1793, for example,
French sympathizers claimed that this action was beyond the
President's constitutional powers. The Constitution, they
maintained, gave him as the Chief Executive power to conduct
or execute foreign policy. Power to make substantive foreign
policy, on the other hand, was thought to reside in Congress.
That incident gave rise to the first great debate, the PacificusHelvidius articles by Hamilton and Madison, over the respective foreign policy roles of Congress and the President under
the newly ratified Constitution.' Since that time the two
branches have often struggled for control of United States foreign policy, each asserting that the Constitution, extraconstitutional powers, or necessity gave it authority to act in a
particular instance. While the Constitution itself carefully divides foreign policy powers between Congress and the Executive3
(and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary), the Executive has for a
multitude of reasons come to dominate American foreign policy.,
2. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 178-82 (4th
ed. 1957). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-67 (1978); Sofaer,
The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. (No. 2) 12 (1976).
3. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A NonjudicialModel, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 486-88 (1976). Corwin notes that
while the framers closely adhered to the constitutional prescriptions of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone in most respects, they deviated radically and intentionally from
those theories in their distribution of foreign affairs powers. E. CORWIN, supra note 2,
at 416-18.
4. E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 185. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972); Johnson & McCormick, Foreign Policy by Executive
Fiat, 28 FOREIGN POL'Y 117 (1977); Patterson, The Rise of PresidentialPower Before
World War II, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (No. 2) 39 (1976). Despite this dramatic
increase in presidential power, in many areas the President's ability to control policy
is severely limited. For example, appropriations from prior years and the costs of
ongoing programs mean that approximately three-quarters of the federal budget consists of "uncontrollable outlays," and for political reasons much of the remaining one-
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In recent years, however, Congress has begun to reassert
its constitutional role in the conduct of foreign policy with new
legislation relating to war powers5 and oversight of executive
agreements.' Additionally, in the less exotic area of foreign and
military aid Congress has attempted to control what it has
perceived as unchecked executive discretion and error. In these
endeavors Congress appears to have been motivated both by a
desire to correct "erroneous" substantive policies of past Presidents and to redress a procedural imbalance, a deviation from
the constitutional plan. For example, the War Powers Resolution was a response to the substantive policy of the war in
Indochina, but its form is general and procedural; it is framework legislation which implements constitutionally prescribed
powers So, too, in the field of foreign aid, Congress has become increasingly sensitive to criticisms that the United States
too frequently supports the "wrong" side in foreign military
conflicts and that U.S. development assistance stabilizes repressive or dictatorial regimes abroad.8 Consequently, Congress
has moved to cut off aid to particular countries that, for example, consistently violate human rights9 and has also attempted
to make general statutory changes to improve the procedure by
which human rights issues are made a part of the foreign aid
decisionmaking process.' 0 While the new foreign aid legislation
is not fundamental framework legislation in the sense that the
War Powers Resolution is, it serves the dual purposes of injecting new substantive policies into aid decisionmaking and of
increasing congressional participation in that process.
One of the more interesting means by which Congress has
attempted to alter executive practice in foreign aid is the imposition of conditions on aid. By such conditions Congress proquarter is uncontrollable as a practical matter. Dam, The American Fiscal
Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 280 (1977).
5. Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555.
6. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. III 1973).
7. Casper, supra note 3, at 481-82.
8. Hearings on S. 1816and H.R. 9005 Before the Subcomm. on ForeignAssistance
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 424 (1975) (statement of
Sen. Humphrey); Gelb, Arms Sales, 25 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 14 (1976-1977).
9. E.g., Uruguay. See Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-441, § 505, 90 Stat. 1473 (1976).
10. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502B, added by International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat.
748-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976)).
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vides that a country which engages in certain activities may be
denied foreign or military aid. While Congress had imposed
conditions of one sort or another on foreign aid for many years,
only recently have conditions become a detailed and important
part of every major foreign aid bill.
How effective are these congressional efforts? To date congressional attempts to control foreign relations through legislation have produced mixed results in terms of articulating a
coherent foreign policy and advancing American foreign policy
goals. Most notably, the constant stream of amendments to
foreign aid legislation, many in the form of conditions on aid,
indicates continuing congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of military and development aid programs. This article
will focus on several such conditions on aid that have been
enacted in recent years. The constitutional background of this
practice and the structure of current foreign aid programs will
be discussed; then the mechanics of some of these conditions
clauses will be examined in detail. In particular, this essay will
examine the operation of such a clause in the Turkish arms
embargo of 1974-75 and some of the more recent attempts by
Congress to relate foreign aid to human rights by the use of
conditions clauses.
The analysis of these statutory conditions on aid reveals
persistent problems, but also points to several considerations
which could guide Congress to more effective use of legislative
conditions. The greatest difficulty with such conditions is their
pervasiveness. So many different kinds of conditions are imposed upon so many*different types of aid that it is doubtful
that either Congress or the Executive knows exactly what is or
is not prohibited. This proliferation of conditions may serve to
diminish the respect for and adherence to those prohibitions
which are most important to U.S. foreign policy.
Assuming that it is impossible, or, if not impossible, undesirable for Congress to control the daily conduct of foreign policy, it should be sufficient, in most cases, for Congress to:
1. Ensure that a particular consideration (e.g.,
human rights or prevention of nuclear proliferation)
is made a part of foreign aid decisionmaking;
2. Require the Executive to collect necessary
information and transmit it to Congress; and
3. Provide itself with some means of reviewing
and modifying Executive action.
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These guidelines are necessarily somewhat vague. But, as
the examples in this article show, rigid formulas are frequently
counterproductive, while "flexibility" without at least general
goals leads only to undirected pragmatism. It is between these
twin hazards that the path towards constitutional and effective
foreign policy decisionmaking lies.

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

While a full analysis of the constitutionality of conditions
in foreign relations legislation is beyond the scope of this article, much of the debate over such conditions takes place within
the framework of the Constitution, and several major themes
recur.
A. The Language of the Constitution
Unlike legislative-executive controversies in some other
areas of foreign relations, the constitutional underpinnings of
foreign aid are quite clear:
The Congress shall have Power to ...
provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . [and] to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law ....
11

And perhaps most importantly, Congress has the power to
make all laws "necessary and proper" to carry out the powers
vested by the Constitution in the federal government. 3
The President's foreign aid powers are more ambiguous.
His powers to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors (with
the consent of the Senate) 4 may certainly influence foreign aid
decisions. However, his more general powers to execute the
laws, 5 appoint officers of the United States," veto legislation, 7
and his inherently "executive" powers 8 are probably more
important in his impact upon foreign aid. Looking simply at
the language of the Constitution, then, the President's power
over foreign aid is seen to be incomplete and indirect.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 9,
§ 8,
art.
§ 3.
§ 2,
art.
art.

cl. 7.
cl.18.
II, § 2, c. 2.
cl. 2.
I, § 7, cl. 2.
II, § 1, c. 1.
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The spending power and the necessary and proper clause
give Congress control over grants of money and assistance to
other countries, and Congress could constitutionally end all
foreign and military aid programs whenever it desires. It has
the power to authorize or not to authorize foreign aid, to appropriate or not to appropriate funds at will. If Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign aid funds, the Executive is probably obligated to spend them. 9 As Professor Henkin has written:
However unhappy the consequences of division of authority in
this context, one must conclude that Congress could insist on its
spending power as on other express powers, and in foreign, as in
domestic matters, can spend (or not spend) according to its views
2
of the general welfare of the United States. 1

Foreign assistance may be contrasted with congressional
efforts to control, by means of its spending power, foreign policy powers vested elsewhere than in Congress. In 1940, for example, there was an effort in the House to sever relations with
the Soviet Union by striking from the appropriations bill the
salary of the U.S. ambassador to that country. The measure
was defeated 105-108.21 Since the Constitution explicitly vests
the power to appoint ambassadors in the President and the
Senate, 22 and not in the Congress, an attempt by Congress to
control this aspect of foreign policy by means of its legitimate
spending power might be unconstitutional. If Congress is constitutionally unable to regulate some aspect of foreign policy
directly, arguably it cannot regulate it indirectly by refusing to
23
appropriate necessary funds.
B. Constitutionaland UnconstitutionalConditions
Beyond the clear power of Congress to control foreign and
19. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).

20. L.

HENKIN,

supra note 4, at 110. The congressional spending power is indepen-

dent of the enumerated powers, and spending decisions although theoretically limited
by the general welfare requirement are essentially unreviewable on that basis. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
21. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign
Relations, 289 ANNALS 145, 156-57 (1953). For other examples of congressional attempts
to control foreign policy through the appropriations process, see L. HENKIN, supra note
4, at 353 n.52 and sources cited therein. See also Schlesinger, Congress and the Making
of American Foreign Policy, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 78 (1972).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. This is particularly true in cases where the power sought by Congress is explicitly vested in another branch of government. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
164 (1926) (addressing the presidential removal power).
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military aid appropriations, Congress' powers become more
uncertain. It can be argued that the greater power, to cut off
funds completely, necessarily includes the lesser power to appropriate funds with certain conditions attached. This reasoning, however, has been challenged in the area of domestic
spending, where the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"
may operate to prohibit Congress from using its power to spend
for the general welfare to legislate unconstitutionally over matters left to the states.24 A similar argument can be made in
foreign affairs legislation: Congress cannot regulate indirectly
by conditions on appropriations that which it could not regulate directly. 5 As with the question of the constitutional use of
the power not to appropriate, the issue becomes: What can
Congress regulate directly? Where the Constitution vests a particular power in another branch of government, Congress cannot usurp that power by attaching conditions to appropriations
legislation. Thus Congress could not condition appropriation of
a salary for the ambassador to the Court of St. James on the
appointment of a particular person to that position. The President and the Senate have the power to appoint ambassadors,
and Congress cannot encroach upon that power indirectly. To
use Professor Henkin's term, this expenditure is "obligatory"
26
and conditions may not be imposed.
Foreign aid spending, on the other hand, is voluntary, and
decisions to appropriate or not, to attach conditions or not, do
not generally conflict with powers given to the President. Foreign aid spending results from a determination by Congress
that such spending is in the interests of the country; no constitutionally based power of the President would give him the
authority to conduct a foreign aid program without enabling
legislation and financing by Congress.
24. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). See Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HA]v. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975). See also Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (discussing
unconstitutional conditions in state legislation).
25. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 113-16.
26. Id. at 115. The appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, "seeks to
preserve an executive check upon legislative authority in the interest of avoiding an
undue concentration of power in Congress." L. TwBE, supra note 2, at 184-85. See
generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Attempting to limit this conclusion, one writer asserts
that, while Congress may refuse appropriations for foreign aid,
it cannot interfere with the President's conduct of foreign aid
programs.27 Professor Wallace claims that "the Constitution, as
it has developed, has conferred upon the executive branch exclusive powers over a 'core area' of decisions in this field of
foreign affairs, 28 a core that includes the making of policy and
"all diplomatic and Commander-in-Chief foreign affairs decisions except for the following particular classes: . . . the withholding of appropriations altogether. ' 29 Under this extreme
view of presidential power, virtually all restrictions in present
30
foreign aid legislation would be found unconstitutional.
This conception of presidential power is based almost entirely on the "gloss of life" interpretation of the Constitution 3'
and has little relation to the text itself. The mere fact that a
practice has been followed for some years does not make it
constitutional; much less does it make it constitutionally required. While a President would surely think it convenient to
the conduct of foreign policy to have a large fund available to
disburse to other countries at his discretion, there is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, if it chooses, attach valid
conditions to the use of such money. "Valid" conditions would
seem to include the naming of countries to which foreign aid
may be given, the people in those countries who are to benefit,
and the activities of countries which should result in termination of aid. Since the power to grant foreign aid rests solely with
Congress, virtually any conditions would be constitutional unless they trenched upon some power explicitly given to the
Executive by the Constitution. An example of such an unconstitutional condition might be a foreign aid bill conditioned on
the appointment of a particular person as administrator of the
program. This might be found to interfere with the power of the
27. Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over ForeignAid,
Parts I & II, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 453. See also Note, The Appropriation Power as a
Tool of Congressional Foreign Policy Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 34, 45-50 (Special Issue
1970).
28. Wallace, supra note 27, at 294-95.
29. Id. at 320-21 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 472-80.
31. The phrase is Justice Frankfurter's. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (concurring opinion). See Casper, supra note 3, at 477-80.

1978

FOREIGN RELATIONS LEGISLATION

President and the Senate to appoint officers of the United
States.32
It is true, as the gloss of life interpretation would emphasize, that foreign aid is now an integral part of United States
foreign policy as a whole, and that foreign aid policy has generally been formulated, within broad limits, by the Executive.
Such an observation, however, does not rise to. the level of a
constitutional objection to legislative conditions in foreign aid
programs. As Professor Henkin puts it:
Congress has insisted and Presidents have reluctantly accepted
that in foreign affairs, as in domestic affairs, spending is expressly entrusted to Congress and its judgments as to the general
welfare of the United States, and it can designate the recipients
of its largesse and impose other conditions upon it. 31

Few court decisions have dealt with the constitutionality
of conditions imposed in foreign affairs legislation. As we have
seen, some conditions might be unconstitutional while others
would not be. One lower court dealing with wartime economic
regulation broadly stated that:
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority
not only to designate the purposes of the appropriation, but also
the executive department
the terms and conditions under which
3
may expend such appropriations. 1

But the only important decision actually dealing with a condi35 There,
tion on foreign aid is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.
the Second Circuit rejected a claim that the Hickenlooper
Amendment, requiring termination of aid to countries which
expropriated American-owned property without compensation,
was an unconstitutional legislative interference with executive
power." The court noted that the Constitution commits foreign
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But Professor Henkin doubts that the President
could completely ignore the improper condition unless he could "assume that Congress
would have made the contribution unconditionally if it had known the condition would
fail." L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 115.
33. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 114. See E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 129: "Of
course, I am not suggesting that Congress may not stipulate any terms it chooses as
the conditions of making an appropriation and thereby limit the scope of the inherently
executive prerogative of planning and directing expenditure."
34. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff'd,
154 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946).
35. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
36. 383 F.2d at 182-83. Accord, D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 317 A.2d 38
(Del. Ch. 1973). In Aerotrade v. Agency for International Development, 387 F. Supp.
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relations powers both to the Executive and to the Legislature
and found the condition valid under the commerce and necessary and proper clauses.
C. Concurrent Resolutions
Another constitutional issue in the control of foreign relations is the use of the concurrent resolution as a legislative veto
of executive action. 7 The administration and much of the daily
policymaking within programs such as foreign aid is necessarily
delegated to the Executive. In its attempts to regain some of
this power, Congress has increasingly enacted legislation which
allows it in effect to veto a President's action by a concurrent
resolution of both houses. 31 Such resolutions present constitional difficulties in that they purport to make law (or have the
effect of law) without being signed by the President or fulfilling
the alternative requirement of passing each House by a twothirds majority."
Although it is unlikely that the constitutionality of the
concurrent resolution will be definitively resolved, the constitutional arguments are intimately involved in Congress' struggle
to assert foreign affairs power, and they provide a framework
for bargaining between the Executive and the Legislature. Congress' first attempt in 1976 to enact S. 2662, the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, was vetoed
by President Ford," largely because of its seven provisions providing for congressional veto of presidential action by concurrent resolution. Congress retreated somewhat and deleted five
974 (D.D.C. 1974), a corporation involved in a financial dispute with the government
of Haiti sought a writ of mandamus to compel AID to terminate development assistance because Haiti had expropriated the corporation's property without compensation. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing and that there was no subject
matter jurisdiction. A claim that the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contained an
invalid delegation to the Executive of Congress' power to wage war was rejected as a
political question in Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
929 (1972).
37. See generally S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 112-23 (1975) and the authorities cited therein; Note, Constitutionality
of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593 (1976).
38. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(c), 87 Stat. 556-57
(1973); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 444 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. 2367 (1970)).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
40. S. 2662, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See President Ford's veto message, 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 828 (1976).
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of these provisions in the substitute bill, H.R. 13680, which was
later passed and signed by the President.4 ' While neither the
President nor Congress "won" in the dispute over the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the issue was an important part
of the legislative debate and did emerge as a bargaining chip
in reaching a compromise.

III.

THE FOREIGN AID BACKGROUND

42

A.

Historical Summary
Large grants of military and economic aid to other countries are a relatively recent aspect of American foreign policy.
The Marshall Plan was the first large-scale program of grants
of economic aid to other countries, and its remarkable success
led to other efforts to support U.S. interests abroad with economic and military grants and loans.4 3 Foreign aid, which had
at first been looked upon as a temporary necessity, became a
permanent feature of U.S. foreign policy during the 1950s. In
this period,
foreign aid was justified primarily as a national security measure,
needed to strengthen allies and to build up low-income countries
so that they would be less vulnerable to communist invasion or
4
takeover.

Many of the same purposes continued to guide foreign aid policies during the 1960s, although the program itself received
smaller appropriations, making it less important "both abso'4 5
lutely and in relation to other sources of assistance.
Foreign aid today is in a state of flux. It suffers from public
animosity, with recent polls showing that 56% of the American
people favor cuts in aid." As a percentage of our Gross National
Product, "development assistance has fallen from 2.79% at the
41. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). See also the
Senate debate on joint and concurrent resolutions, 122 CONG. REc. S9022-29 (daily ed.
June 11, 1976).
42. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "foreign aid" means bilateral
economic and military grants, loans, guaranties, and credits.
43. K. WALTZ, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 182-85, 210-17 (1967).
44. R. ASHER, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE INTHE SEVENTIES 4 (1970). For a concise
summary of the traditional purposes of foreign assistance see id. at 19-38.
45. Id. at 4. See id. at 78.
46. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance, supra note 8,
at 74 (testimony of Joseph Nye, Jr.), citing a Dec. 1974 poll by the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations.
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height of the Marshall Plan to 0.23% in 1974-75." 4 With more
funds being disbursed through multilateral organizations, traditional bilateral programs have accounted for an increasingly
smaller share of U.S. assistance to Third World countries,48 and
in fiscal year 1978 U.S. multilateral foreign assistance funds
may for the first time exceed bilateral funds.49 Among the reasons for this shift towards distribution of funds through international agencies was the feeling that such agencies were
"apolitical" and "neutral" and, therefore, better conduits for
foreign aid money. Congress has recently discovered, however,
that such institutions are less susceptible to its control and has
moved to add conditions to its appropriations to multinational
agencies. 0
Despite these difficulties, Congress in the last few years
has attempted to set "new directions" for foreign assistance,
emphasizing aid that actually gets to the neediest people, 5' the
implementation of "intermediate technology, 5' 2 and providing
for the phase-out of military assistance grants. 3 Furthermore,
despite reduced funding, appropriations for foreign aid remain
significant, particularly in the eyes of the countries that receive
such aid.54
47. Id. at 506 (testimony of Roy Prosterman). This low level of foreign aid funding
continued into 1978. Despite a campaign promise to increase aid to one-half of one
percent of the Gross National Product (G.N:P.), domestic economic pressures have
forced President Carter to postpone any increase above the present one-quarter of one
percent. The Administration still hopes to raise this figure to one-third of one percent
by 1982. The United States is now twelfth on the list of nations in the percentage of
G.N.P. given as foreign aid. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1978, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
48. For a detailed comparison of multilateral and bilateral expenditures, see Center for Int'l Policy, Foreign Aid: Evading the Control of Congress, reprinted in 123
CONG. REC. S3630-40 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1977).
49. See 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 620 (1977).
50. For an excellent discussion of this and other recent developments relating to
human rights and foreign aid, see Drew, A Reporter at Large (Human Rights), THE
NEW YORKER, July 18, 1977, at 36, 44-52. See also text accompanying notes 157-63
infra.
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2151(b) (Supp. IV 1974), as amended by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 304, 89 Stat. 857-58.
52. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 306(2), 89 Stat. 858-59 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151(d) (Supp. V 1975)).
53. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 105, 90 Stat. 782 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2321j (1976)).
54. Military assistance outlays, including grants, training, and credit for arms
sales, totalled $1.1 billion in FY 1976; security supporting assistance outlays were $601
million for FY 1976 and are estimated at $1.5 billion for FY 1977. Bilateral develop-
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Congress and Foreign Aid
With the exception of the rapid congressional response to
Truman's European Recovery Program in 1948, the relationship between Congress and the foreign aid program has been
uneasy at best. Congress is often criticized as provincial and
isolationist, continually obstructing executive efforts to construct an internationalist, bipartisan foreign policy.55 Recent
studies have given greater emphasis to the constructive role
that Congress has often played in foreign aid policy,5" but the
fact remains that foreign aid is a favorite target for congressional budget cutting. One writer found that of seventeen foreign affairs agencies studied over a twelve year period, the
Agency for Internationial Development (AID)-the main channel for nonsecurity foreign assistance-consistently received
the largest budget cuts. The AID appropriation averaged nineteen percent below the administration-requested figure.57
In addition to maintaining foreign aid at a fairly low level
of funding, Congress has used the annual aid bills to express
its approval or disapproval of the administration's conduct of
foreign policy and to direct foreign policy in ways it thinks
desirable. This is understandable, given that
B.

the aid program is the one item on the legislative agenda where
questions of money, administration, and the content of policy
come together in a way that permits Congress to get at them. 58

Foreign aid is one of the few areas of foreign affairs where
Congress can legislate as it wishes without raising constitutional questions.
ment assistance, mostly through the Agency for International Development (AID),
hovers at approximately $1.2 billion per year, and other aid grants including Food for
Peace (the "P.L. 480" program) account for another $1 billion annually. U.S. GOVERNMENT, BuDGEr FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 75, U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR
1978, at 89. It should be noted, however, that "[tihe United States as recently as 1965
furnished about 60 percent of all the aid donated by the world's nations. This now has
fallen to the 25 percent range; most aid recipients currently depend on the United
States for less than 15 percent of their total foreign aid." 35 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
620 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 27; Brown, A Cooling-Off Periodfor U.S.-Soviet
Relations, 28 FOREIGN POL'y 3, 16-17 (1977).
56. See, e.g., A. FRYE, A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS: THE PGLrnCS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY 172-73 (1975); K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 196-224.
57. Davis, The Price of Power: The AppropriationsProcess for 17 Foreign Affairs
Agencies, 18 PUB. POL'Y 355 (1970).
58. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 197.
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Congress has communicated these policy preferences
through general precatory language, in conditions attached to
the receipt of foreign aid, and by actions terminating aid to
specific countries. In the early years of foreign aid, general
expressions of policy predominated. The Mutual Security Act
of 1951 required as a condition of eligibility for military, economic, or technical aid that a recipient country, among other
things, "join in promoting international understanding and
goodwill and maintaining world peace."5 The Act also declared
the policy of Congress that aid be used to eliminate barriers to
free enterprise, discourage cartels and monopolies, and encourage free labor unions and collective bargaining. 0 A 1955
amendment added that prior recipients of aid should be encouraged to help in aid programs because "certain other
friendly nations of the world remain in need of assistance in
order that they may defend themselves against aggression and
contribute to the security of the free world."'" This statement
of policy was amended in 1956 to dramatize Congress' concern
that world peace and U.S. security
are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls continue by threat of military action, use of
economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent and continue to deny the rights of freedom and selfgovernment to peoples and nations once free but now subject to
such domination ....62

Even in the 1950s such general language was not the only
direction given by Congress to foreign aid policy. An amendment in 1956 required that aid to Yugoslavia be cut off after
ninety days unless the President determined, inter alia, that
Yugoslavia remained independent of Soviet control and was
not engaged in any program for communist world conquest. 3
The President did make such a determination, but, as Kenneth
Waltz comments, "The Congressionally prescribed procedure
59. Act of Oct. 10, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-165, § 511(a)(1), 65 Stat. 381, this section
repealed by Pub. L. No. 83-665, 68 Stat. 861 (1954).
60. Id. § 516, 65 Stat. 382.
61. Mutual Security Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-138, § 549(a)(3), 69 Stat. 289.
62. Mutual Security Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-726, § 2, 70 Stat. 555.
63. Id. § 5, 70 Stat. 556, this section repealed by Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 460
(1961).
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placed Yugoslavia in a position of dependence upon an uncertain benefactor in a fashion she found insulting." 4
Five years later the foreign aid program was completely
overhauled by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.5 This Act
included examples of all three of the means by which Congress
has controlled foreign aid. There was a lengthy statement of
general policy," an absolute prohibition of aid "to the present
government of Cuba," 7 and a conditional provision, prohibiting assistance to any country "unless the President determines
that such country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.""8 The 1961 Act, still the
major foreign aid statute, has been repeatedly amended, often
for the purpose of imposing new conditions on the granting of
U.S. aid or of injecting new policy considerations into the making of aid decisions.69 In a single section of the Act as codified,70
an informal count found six separate factors which are to operate absolutely to prohibit aid to a country, ten factors which
are to prohibit aid in the absence of a contrary presidential
determination, and four other factors which are to be
"considered" in making aid decisions. Congress has also acted
in recent years to impose expenditure limits on aid that will go
to a particular country. 7
C. The Controversy over Conditions on Foreign Aid
The executive branch has usually resented congressional
restrictions on foreign aid, whatever form they have taken.
President Nixon in particular criticized the imposition of
"counterproductive conditions on specific programs," and said
that he would "strongly resist efforts by the Congress to impose
unreasonable demands upon the necessary prerogatives of the
64. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 199.
65. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.).
66. Id. § 102, 75 Stat. 424-25.
67. Id. § 620(a), 75 Stat. 444.
68. Id. § 620(b), 75 Stat. 445.
69. For a review of these amendments, particularly those related to humanitarian
concerns, see Farer, United States ForeignPolicy and the Protectionof Human Rights:
Observations and Proposals, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 623, 641-46 (1974).
70. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (Supp. 1977).
71. For example, economic aid to Chile for fiscal year 1976 was limited to $90
million. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 320, 89 Stat. 868.
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executive. 7 2 Some commentators support the assertion that
such conditions unconstitutionally hinder the President's conduct of foreign policy.7 3 More disinterested observers have also
criticized the heavy-handed use of legislative restrictions on
foreign aid. As Robert Asher writes:
[R]estrictive amendments and provisions considered offensive
by self-respecting nations have made this country's bilateral development assistance program progressively more difficult-almost impossible-to administer."

Indeed, a major effort is now underway to overhaul the entire
foreign aid program.75
Presidents worry not only about the ways in which foreign
aid conditions may limit their diplomatic flexibility, but also
about the effectiveness of using U.S. "leverage" in this manner.
A frequently cited example of a congressional restriction that
backfired is the Jackson-Vanik amendment which denied
"most favored nation" status to the Soviet Union until all restrictions on emigration of Soviet Jews were lifted.76 The result
was a decrease both in the number of annual emigrants from
35,000 to 10,000 and in the volume of Soviet-U.S. trade.77 The
Nixon and Ford administrations generalized the "lesson" of
that experience into a theory that U.S. influence over other
countries is greatest when military and economic ties remain
close. As Secretary of State Kissinger testified:
Certainly we cannot-and we do not-ignore domestic practices
of countries receiving security assistance which deny those
human rights that civilized states commonly agree are inalienable ....
We make our views-and those of Congress-known to
the governments concerned. We are convinced, however, that
withdrawal of security assistance is an extreme measure that
harms other objectives while holding little promise for effecting
72. National Legislative Goals, The President's Message to Congress, 9 WEEKLY
Docs. 1074, 1099 (1973). See also President Carter's opposition to
conditions on U.S. contributions to multilateral aid agencies, note 160 infra.
73. Wallace, supra note 27; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
74. R. ASHER, supra note 44, at 4.
75. 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 620 (1977).
76. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 2056-60 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2432 (Supp. IV 1974)).
77. Kissinger, American Ideals and American Foreign Policy, STATE DEP'T
NEWSLETrER, Nov. 1976, at 12; Yergin, Politicsand Soviet-American Trade: The Three
Questions, 55 FOREIGN An'. 517 (1977).
COMP. OF PREs.

1978

FOREIGN RELATIONS LEGISLATION

desirable changes. Indeed, experience has shown that our influence with other nations depreciates as we cut the bonds that hold
us together."

Following this prescription during the Nixon and Ford years,
although the State Department privately expressed to certain
countries disapproval of human rights violations and apparently considered that factor in making aid decisions, they never
altered any aid decisions because of such violations."
Recent policy statements notwithstanding, there are indications that at least some legislative conditions are sometimes
effective. The Hickenlooper Amendment, requiring termination of aid to any country that expropriated American-owned
property without compensation, "did encourage Brazil to compensate American power companies for property that had been
taken" 0 and induced Honduras to abandon a plan to redistribute uncultivated property owned by the United Fruit Company.9 ' Of course, it is impossible to tell what actions by other
countries may have died in the planning stage because of the
deterrent effect of the Amendment. Leslie Gelb, in surveying
U.S. arms sales, reaches a conclusion exactly contrary to Kissinger's "don't cut the bonds" approach. He states that, although arms sales provide only limited leverage with which to
influence buyers' domestic policies,
the United States seems to have gotten better leverage from denials or threats to deny sales than by completing sales. Threats to
deny sales appear to have convinced South Korea not to buy a
reprocessing plant, to have persuaded Turkey not to invade Cy78. Hearings on FY 1977 InternationalSecurity Assistance Programs Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 8 (1976).
79. Id. at 108-09 (testimony of Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State);
Hearings on the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976 Before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17 (testimony of

Carlyle Maw, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance), 140-43 (testimony of
Lt. General Howard Fish, Director, Defense Security Assistance) (1976).
80. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 199.
81. Lipson, CorporatePreferencesand Public Policies:ForeignAid Sanctionsand

Investment Protection, 28 WORLD POL. 396 (1976). The rigidities of the Hickenlooper
Amendment may have been counterproductive in Peru, where the cutoff of aid to a
slightly left-leaning government may have contributed to a coup which brought a
leftist military dictator to power. See A. FRYE & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTION 34-36 (1976). (The Hickenlooper Amendment discussed here should not be confused with the "second" Hickenlooper Amendment, now
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), which modified the "act of state" doctrine.).
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prus in 1964 and 1968, and perhaps made Israel more amenable
to negotiations with Egypt. 2

Another difficulty with legislative restrictions on foreign
aid has been the need to combine policy direction by Congress
with flexibility. International conditions change; many different considerations are involved in a given aid decision. To
avoid the twin hazards of ineffective policy statements and
rigid prohibitions, Congress has often turned to presidential
"determinations" to implement its foreign aid policies. A typical provision is section 33 of the Arms Export Control Act
(formerly the Foreign Military Sales Act)8 3 which limits the
total amount of military assistance, credits, and loans to African countries to $40 million per year. This section also provides
that "the President may waive the limitations of this section
when he determines it to be important to the security of the
United States, and promptly so reports to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."'" The section was amended to its present
form in December 1974 and was waived by President Ford in
both 1975 and 1976.15 Since these waivers included absolutely
no discussion of the reasons for making the determinations,
they offered a convenient way for the administration to evade
the congressional policy of limiting arms sales to Africa. While
the fact that such waivers are made does not necessarily mean
that the statutory policy is being ignored, it does indicate that
waivable restrictions may not be an effective means for Congress to exercise direction over foreign policy.8"
Several points emerge from this survey of recent foreign
aid restrictions. Congress is seeking to increase its control over
foreign aid, and one means of control is the imposition of conditions on recipients of aid. The executive branch has resisted
such conditions on the grounds that they interfere with needed
flexibility in foreign policy and may, in fact, backfire. While
82. Gelb, supra note 8,at 20.
83. 22 U.S.C. § 2773 (Supp. IV 1974).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 2773(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
85. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24887 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 25879 (1976). For a more egregious
example of executive evasion of a legislative condition by waiver, see note 110 infra.
86. In addition to numerous specific waiver provisions, the President has the
authority to make annual grants of up to $50 million per country (with an overall limit
of $250 million) which are not subject to the statutory conditions discussed here. 22
U.S.C. § 2364a (Supp. IV 1974).

1978

FOREIGN RELATIONS LEGISLATION

there is evidence that some conditions may have been effective
at one time or another, most may be evaded by presidential
"determinations" over which Congress has exercised little review.
With this background we examine in detail several recent
cases of legislative conditions.
IV.

THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

The Chronology of CongressionalAction
The Foreign Assistance Act has long included a provision
stating that military assistance is "furnished solely for internal
security, for legitimate self-defense, [and] to permit the recipient country to partieipate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.""7 Similarly, grants of defense articles and sales by
the United States government will not be made unless the
recipient country agrees that it will not use or permit the use
of such articles for purposes other than those for which they
were furnished."8 A country which is in "substantial" violation
of these provisions "shall be immediately ineligible for further
assistance." 9 There is, however, a statutory means by which
these restrictions can be avoided: The President has authority
to make annual grants, free from the statutory restrictions, of
up to $50 million per country, if he determines that such grants
are important to United States security. 0
On July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, ostensibly for
the purpose of protecting Turkish Cypriots in the instability
following a July 15 coup. 9' This invasion involved the use of
United States defense articles and services for purposes other
than those for which they were supplied. Security assistance to
Turkey had been based on a 1947 agreement in which the govA.

87. 22 U.S.C. § 2313 (1970).
88. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d)(1) (1970) (grants); 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974)
(government sales). General power to regulate and license commercial, as opposed to
government, arms sales has been delegated by Congress to the President. 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2778 (Supp. 1977). This delegation was held to be constitutional in United States v.
Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976). Congress, of course, frequently acts to
prohibit commercial sales to particular countries, as it did in the Turkish embargo.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1970); 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c) (Supp. IV 1974), as amended
by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 304(b)(1), 90 Stat. 754.
90. 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
91. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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ernment had agreed not to use such assistance for purposes
other than those for which it was given. 2 The problem arose of
what, if anything, to do to enforce the statutory mandate.
An initial difficulty with the statutory restriction was the
mechanism for enforcement. In the eyes of Congress the invasion made Turkey "immediately ineligible" for further military
grants, credits, or government sales. However, termination of
such assistance required affirmative action from an executive
branch that never admitted that Turkey had violated the restrictions in the first place. 3 Thus, contrary to the intent of the
Foreign Assistance Act, the President neither halted military
aid to Turkey, nor did he make a determination that despite
Turkish violations continued assistance was important to the
security of the United States. 4
Frustrated by presidential inaction and supported by public opinion in some sectors, 5 Congress moved to cut off aid to
Turkey. The first major action was a sense of the Senate resolution which passed on September 19, 1974, by a vote of 64-27.1'
Senator Eagleton, the main Senate proponent of the cutoff,
discussed the statutory conditions and, in language reminiscent of the then recently concluded impeachment inquiry,
stated:"[Tlhe amendment I propose today is intended to
demonstrate that the rule of law in this Nation must prevail
over the policies of men." 7
In the following weeks both Houses of Congress debated
and voted numerous times on various provisions which would
have cut off aid to Turkey until the President certified that
Turkey was in compliance with U.S. foreign aid laws and that
92. Agreement on Aid to Turkey, July 12, 1947, United States-Turkey, art. IV, 61
Stat. 2953, T.I.A.S. No. 1629. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(i) (1970) requires denial of assistance
to any country which engages in or prepares for aggressive military action against a
country which receives aid from the United States. In 1974 Cyprus was receiving both
P.L. 480 food assistance and regular foreign aid. 120 CONG. REc. 31915 (1974) (remarks
of Sen. Eagleton).
93. 30 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 548 (1974).
94. Some Congressmen suggested that the President could not in good faith make
such a determination. 120 CONG. REc. 31914 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton), 31916 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson) (1974).
95. See, e.g., editorial, N.Y. Times, Sep. 14, 1974, at 28, col. 1. There was also a
well-organized lobbying effort by Greek-Americans.
96. See the debate in the Senate, 120 CONG. REc. 31913-23 (1974).
97. Id. at 31913.
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substantial progress had been made toward a settlement of the
Cyprus conflict. These provisions, which took the form of
amendments to continuing appropriations resolutions, met
extreme opposition from the administration-President Ford

twice vetoed the measures. 9 The President objected to the aid
cutoff because he said that it undercut his "ability to act" and
did not provide the "flexibility needed to carry forward the
foreign policy of the United States."' 00 He warned that the
absolute cutoff might lead to Turkish reprisals including possible withdrawal from NATO or interference with U.S. intelligence operations there. It was also claimed that the cutoff would
make a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question less likely.
A compromise was reached on October 17 with a measure
which prohibited further aid to Turkey, but allowed the President to delay the prohibition until December 10, 1974.101 The

regular 'foreign aid bill, passed December 18, allowed a further
delay of the cutoff until February 5, 1975.102 On February 5,
President Ford reluctantly suspended arms shipments and
other military assistance 3 because he could not make the required findings that Turkey was in compliance with the statutory conditions and that there had been substantial progress
towards a Cyprus settlement.
Arms shipments to Turkey remained at a standstill for the

next eight months. During that time attempts were made to
move towards a resolution of the Cyprus problem, and the
administration continually urged Congress to lift the embargo.
There was a close Senate vote, 40-41, on May 19 on a bill which
would have completely lifted the embargo. In supporting the
bill, Senator Sparkman expressed what appears to have been
the feeling of many Congressmen regarding the embargo: "I
cannot help but feel that we did not realize the lengths to which
98. For a detailed summary of the House and Senate actions, see 30 CONG. Q.
533-53 (1974).
99. H.J. Res. 1131, H.J. Res. 1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For President
Ford's veto messages, see 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1282, 1316-17 (1974).
100. Id. at 1283.
101. Act of Oct. 17, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-448, § 6, 88 Stat. 1363 (1974).
102. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 22, 88 Stat. 1801
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (Supp. IV 1974)).
103. See 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PaFas. Docs. 155 (1975).
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we went, under Foreign Assistance Act provisions, in cutting
off military equipment deliveries to Turkey."' 14
Before the House in turn considered the Senate bill, Turkey had announced a thirty day timetable for the shutdown of
some twenty-seven U.S. military and intelligence operations
there.'"5 In an effort to assure House passage, a compromise bill
had been agreed upon in committee which prohibited direct
military grants, allowed government-to-government credit
sales only to fulfill NATO responsibilities, and allowed commercial cash sales of arms.'"' The bill would also have allowed
delivery of $185 million of arms purchased from the government before the February 5 embargo. Despite these changes
from the Senate's complete lifting of the ban, and despite intensive lobbying by the administration, 17 the House on July 24,
1975, rejected the bill, 206-223. As in the original embargo vote
in the Senate in 1974, debate focused on the problem of condoning violation of U.S. law versus the need for a flexible,
pragmatic foreign policy.
One day after the House action, Turkey closed down joint
Turkish-American bases and post exchanges on American military installations and declared the 1969 bilateral defense agreement dead. 0 8 These developments were viewed with extreme
dismay by the administration. They tended to support fears
that the arms embargo would not solve the Cyprus problem
and would weaken NATO and undermine intelligencegathering efforts.0 9
Following its August recess, the House, with a contrite
heart, passed a bill similar to the one it had rejected in July."
104. 121 CONG. REc. S8624 (daily ed. May 19, 1975).
105. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 6, col. 4.
106. S. 846, as amended, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See H.R. REP. No. 365, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
107. See 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1607 (1975).
108. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
109. See, e.g., 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 845 (1975).
110. Act of Oct. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-104, 89 Stat. 508 (codified in various
sections of 22 U.S.C.). See 121 CONG. REc. H9522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1975). The partial
lifting of the embargo is another example of the difficulties inherent in allowing presidential "determinations" that waive congressional restrictions. The bill permitted
U.S. Government arms sales to Turkey if the President determined that they were
necessary in order for Turkey to fulfill its NATO commitments. President Ford made
several such determinations allowing Turkey to obtain up to $125 million of arms in
both fiscal years 1976 and 1977. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1977, § 1, at 7, col. 1. Some have
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After an embargo of eight months, there had been no substantial movement towards a Cyprus settlement, U.S. intelligence
operations in Turkey had been severely curtailed, and TurkishGreek relations remained hostile. By the end of 1975, Turkey
had purchased sixty military helicopters from the Soviet Union
and the two countries had signed a long-range cooperation
agreement."'
B.

Evaluation
Many commentators and politicians have criticized the
Turkish arms embargo. It has been viewed as an embarrassing
example of congressional over-involvement in the conduct of
foreign affairs and as a substantive policy that continues to
have a serious adverse effect on U.S. security. I will not discuss
the ultimate wisdom of the arms embargo in detail, but will
focus instead on several of the factors that led to its passage.
In addition to the myriad pressures of constituents, the
Executive, and the dictates of diplomacy, three aspects of the
statutory framework within which Congress acted contributed
substantially to the passage of the arms embargo. First, as
noted above, the cutoff of arms to a country that used them for
aggressive purposes did not occur automatically or by congressional action; it required an affirmative act by a reluctant President. Second, neither the statute nor any other mechanism
had kept Congress abreast of relevant diplomatic developments or possible consequences of various courses of action;
Congress did not have the information it should have had to
make the decision regarding arms sales to Turkey. Third, and
most importantly, the statutory condition was absolute: If a
recipient country used U.S.-supplied arms aggressively, shipments were to be cutoff. Period. These aspects of the statutory
framework will now be examined in more detail.
1. The Burden of Going Forward
By putting the burden of instituting cuts in military grants
and sales on the President, the Foreign Assistance Act required
a reluctant Executive to act affirmatively or to appear to counviewed these determinations as excessive and as a clear executive evasion of the statutory restriction. See, e.g., G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD 309 (1976).
111. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ForeignAssistance, supranote 78, at 250;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
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tenance violation of the statute. This, coupled with an absence
of active and imaginative diplomacy by the President, contributed to a situation where Congress felt that it had to act by the
passage of a legislative embargo. The President could
have-some would argue should have-cut off aid and arms to
Turkey on his own; the statute gave him that authority. Alternatively Turkey could have been threatened privately with a
cutoff; the administration could have expressed its opinion
that Turkey had violated U.S. law; a partial embargo could
have been imposed. Such affirmative presidential action would
have preserved flexibility. If these efforts failed, the President
would have been put in the uncomfortable position of having
to cut off aid to carry out the threat-and the law-or to use
some other means to get around the statutory restriction." 2
Still, this position could hardly have been more awkward for
the country than what actually happened, and it would have
allowed more time for quiet diplomacy.
Although the facts are difficult to come by, the State Department apparently did not threaten Turkey with a cutoff of
military aid in its attempts to settle the Cyprus dispute." 3 The

consistent administration position was that it would seek a
Cyprus cease-fire and a Turkish withdrawal, but that military
aid to Turkey was a completely unrelated issue, involving U.S.
and NATO security interests."' While neither the old President
nor the new had much time to devote to Cyprus in July and
August of 1974, the lack of presidential action probably reinforced congressional uncertainty as to the Executive's intention
to enforce the law. When Kissinger was asked at a news conference on August 19, 1974, about his interpretation of the statutory cutoff language, he stated that he would have to get a legal
opinion on the matter," 5 despite the relative clarity of the statute. It was probably not any ambiguity in the statute that
bothered the administration, but the unpleasant fact that the
statute required the President to take the initiative.
112. Such as his power to make unconditional limited grants under 22 U.S.C. §
2364(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
113. See, e.g., Kissinger's July 22, 1974, press conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL.
257, 258, 261 (1974).
114. See, e.g., Kissinger's Dec. 7, 1974, press conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL.
909, 916 (1974).
115. 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 353, 357 (1974).
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That some of the blame for the embargo must rest with the
Executive has also been expressed by Alton Frye:
Very early, before there were votes on the Turkish cut off, senior
members of the House were advising the administration not to
let the matter be pressed to a vote. They urged the President to
use his emergency authority to sustain some flow of arms, to
allow some time for diplomacy to show progress on Cyprus, and
to let the House delay action . . . . Had he used the emergency
authority, I think the contretemps could have been avoided or at
least muted."'

The consequences of presidential inaction are particularly
striking when compared with President Johnson's effective
threats of arms cutoffs in 1964 and 1968. President Johnson's
use of the statutory condition in the context of traditional diplomacy helped prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus on both
7
those occasions."
A statute which contained the nonagressive use condition,
but which required Congress to act to cut off arms to an offending country might have avoided some of these problems. The
administration, operating through traditional diplomatic
channels, would still have considerable leverage to pressure a
country not to use the arms aggressively, but it would not be
forced to label a country as an aggressor and to cut off its grants
and arms. sales. The final embargo, after all, was the result of
congressional action; if the statute had made clear that that
was to be the procedure all along, the conflict over the respective roles of the President and the Congress might have been
avoided.
A more clearly drawn statute which put the burden of
initiating a cutoff on Congress rather than on the President
would not necessarily have prevented the diplomatic failures
that led to the embargo. By putting the burden on the Executive, however, the statute helped create a situation in which
executive inaction appeared to be a conscious policy choice and
a violation of the law, and Congress felt compel-led to react
legislatively.
116. Hearings on Congress and Foreign Policy Before the Special Subcomm. on
Investigationsof the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 31 (1976).
117. Gelb, supra note 8, at 20. See also F. VALI, THE TURKISH STRAITS AND NATO
93-95 (1972); President Johnson's 1964 letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet In6nG,
reprinted in id. at 309-13.
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2. Lack of Information
The second deficiency in the statute, Congress' lack of
information, caused many Congressmen later to feel that they
had acted without enough understanding of the complex relationships between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus."' These complaints may be to some extent rationalizations for a policy
choice that went awry; but it is nonetheless true that at the
time the embargo was voted Congress did not have all the
information needed to make the decision. To take one example,
when the House International Relations Committee recommended that the embargo be lifted, it noted that under the
Treaty of Guarantee of 1960"1 Turkey had responsibility to
maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and security
of Cyprus.' 20 If this fact had come out during debate over the
initial aid cutoff, it might have made Turkey's action seem
somewhat less aggressive and less violative of U.S. restrictions
on military aid.
Other informational lacunae were more the fault of the
Executive than of the statute or of Congress' lack of diligence.
For example, even when the embargo was partially lifted in
1975, Congress had not been informed of the exact nature of the
intelligence gathering installations that Turkey had closed
down. The House International Relations Committee was told
that "several installations cannot be duplicated" and that
"others can be duplicated at considerable expense,"'' but the
Committee was not given any facts with which to make its own
conclusions regarding the importance of the installations to
22
U.S. security.
118. Hearings, supra note 116, at 94 (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino).
119. Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, between United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, 382 U.N.T.S. 3.
120. H.R. REP. No. 500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 965, 973. However, the Committee still concluded that Turkey had
violated the statutory restrictions.
121. Id. at 2.
122. As Representative Rosenthal stated:
I would have thought ordinary procedure would have been that Mr. Sisco
or others such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff or CIA, should have come here
and told us what the effect of the loss of the Turkish bases has been?
Rather, we get conclusions without any testimony or supporting documentary material at all.
Hearings on S. 2230 before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1975).
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3. Absolute Nature of the Condition
Perhaps the heart of the problem with the statutory framework was that the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act were absolute in requiring termination of assistance or sales if the recipient country used the defense articles
for prohibited purposes. The statute provided for no alternative
or compromise: The country was to be "immediately ineligible" for further assistance. The combination of the statute cast
in stark black and white terms with the executive inaction
noted above set the stage for a confrontation between Congress
and the President. Furthermore, coming at a time when many
Congressmen already wondered whether presidential policies
could be kept within the bounds of law, the Turkish question
seemed to be a test of legal restraints on the conduct of extralegal diplomacy. It was perceived as a contest between principle and pragmatism:
[Tjo pass this bill [lifting the embargo] would give a sign to
the world that a principle in our aid legislation for over a quartercentury is without significance. Passing this bill will show the
countries which last year bought $10 billion in United States
arms that realistically no restrictions apply to their use.'1

The absolute language of the nonaggressive use condition
thus put Congress in a position where its policy choices were
severely limited.
Consequently, in light of the circumstances and the congressional desire to enforce its statutory condition both against
the President and against Turkey, Congress had little choice
but to act legislatively or allow the restrictions to be flouted.
If one concedes that conditions should be attached to U.S. aid,
then those conditions must-on occasion at least-be enforced.
Inaction would have frustrated goals which were perceived to
be of particular importance, such as the principle of using U.S.supplied weapons for defensive purposes only and the idea that
foreign policy must be conducted according to law. However,
legislative action frustrated other important goals: It did not
lead to a Cyprus solution; it led instead to the closing of U.S.
bases in Turkey.
123. H.R. REP. No. 500, supra note 120, at 31-32 (Opposing views of Reps. Fascell,
Rosenthal, Yatron, Harrington, Collins, and Bonker).
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Disregarding one's evaluation of the embargo itself, it is
evident that at least to some degree Congress suffered from its
own self-imposed rules. The statutory language making violating countries "immediately ineligible" for further assistance
introduced rigidity into a situation which demanded flexibility.24 Compounding the error, the condition put the burden of
finding a violation and cutting off aid on an unwilling Executive, thereby forcing Congress to impose the prescribed penalty. As so often happens when the tool is legislation, the effect
is that of a sledge hammer rather than of a scalpel.
The characteristic rigidity of legislation, however, is present whenever there is a statutory cutoff of aid or arms sales to
a particular country. Nonetheless, despite this inherent handicap Congress frequently makes such legislative determinations
without adverse consequences. Consequently, it was not the
means, legislation, by which Congress acted that was at fault.
Criticism is more appropriately levelled at the statutory framework that helped lead to the embargo. By attaching an absolute condition to aid, by failing to require that information be
transmitted to Congress, and by putting the burden of implementing the cutoff on the President, these statutes forced Congress to act through a predetermined inflexible remedy when
other alternatives might have been more effective.

V.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS

A.

The Evolution of Statutory Conditions
Concern over what many have viewed as a worldwide deterioration of respect for human rights has prompted Congress to
try to relate United States foreign assistance to the preservation of such rights. 2 5 American foreign policy, for better or
worse, has frequently exhibited a strong moral emphasis. During the Cold War, foreign aid measures were directed towards
combatting communism and maintaining "independence" and
"self-government." Failures of old policies, large gaps between
124. It should be noted, however, that Congress did compromise on the cutoff date
and did in fact give the President over three months to work for a settlement through
diplomatic channels.
125. See, e.g., Fraser, Freedom and Foreign Policy, 26 FOREIGN POL'Y 140 (1977).
On Congress and human rights generally, see Salzberg & Young, The Parliamentary
Role in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 251 (1977); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231 (1977).
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theory and practice, a new definition of what is in our "national
interest," and humanitarian concerns have led to "new directions" in American foreign aid programs, including statutory
recognition of human rights. 26
The first legislation regarding human rights in foreign aid
was a sense of Congress provision added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1973 stating that "the President should deny any
economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment
of that country's citizens for political purposes.' ' 27 While this
provision applied to all assistance, later congressional efforts to
incorporate human rights considerations distinguished between military aid and aid given for nonmilitary purposes, and
went beyond simple expressions of policy.
The International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975 contained a detailed human rights provision, added as
section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 2 which applies to
development assistance, but not to disaster assistance or food
aid programs. Under the section, no assistance may be provided to the government of a country which "engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit
the needy people in such country." The proviso ensures that
while human rights are to be linked to American assistance, aid
that actually reaches needy people should not be "conditioned
on their having political freedom."'2 9
The mechanism by which the provision operates is considerably more sophisticated than the statute that led to the
Turkish arms embargo. A conference committee rejected an
earlier provision which would have put the burden of declaring
126. While moral values are an essential part of American foreign policy, some
writers have warned that the United States must do more than merely substitute
human rights platitudes for anticommunist platitudes. As the United States moves
away from its old role as the world's military policeman, it must avoid setting itself
up as the world's "moral policeman." See Szulc, The Limits of Linkage, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 5, 1977, at 19.
127. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 733. For a
discussion of Congress and human rights before 1973, see Weissbrodt, supra note 125,
at 232-40.
128. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (Supp. V 1975)).
129. S. REP. No. 406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1975).
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human rights violations on the President:
In the view of the committee the House language was deficient
in that unless and until the President made a determination in
effect condemning an aid recipient government, the provisions of
the section were not operative. The committee has noted that the
executive branch is reluctant to make such determinations.'IQ

In the measure as adopted, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House International Relations Committee may
require "assurances" from the AID administrator that assistance directly benefits needy people in a particular country and
"a detailed explanation of how that is being accomplished."' 3 '
Annual reports on the steps taken to carry out the provision are
required from the President. 3 1 If Congress then disagrees with
the executive report, it may initiate action to cut off aid by
concurrent resolution-an alternative that has always been
available under section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act.'3 By
this relatively mild provision, Congress has sought to have
human rights factors taken into consideration in foreign aid
allocations, but without requiring the President to brand a
country as a violator or to cut off aid whenever a violation is
found. And, to prevent the Executive from ignoring the statutory direction, Congress has given itself oversight powers and
access to information gathered by the Administration.
Congress has taken a harder line in attaching human
rights conditions to military and security supporting assistance. In 1974 a human rights provision was added as section
502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military
Sales Act.' 4 The section stated that it was the sense of Congress that "the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance" to countries which consistently violate human rights. "Security assistance" included military assistance, security supporting assistance, and government and
commercial sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act. The
only really operative part of the 502B amendment required
130. Id. at 35.
131. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b) (Supp. V 1975)).

132. Id. (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (Supp. V 1975)).
133. 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1970).
134. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1815
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974)).
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that: "Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to
any government falling within the provisions of paragraph (a)
[i.e., violating human rights], the President shall advise the
Congress of the extraordinary circumstances necessitating the
assistance."
The language of 502B contained two obvious implications
which limited its effectiveness. First, and most importantly, it
put the burden on the Executive to make a determination that
a particular country was a gross violator of human rights. Second, it allowed, in effect, evasion of the human rights condition
on the basis of "extraordinary circumstances" without further
defining that term.
Practice under 502B confirmed its deficiencies. One major
stumbling block was resistance in the State Department towards identifying any country as a violator of human rights.
The following exchange between Representative Fraser of the
House International Relations Committee and Carlyle Maw,
Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance is illustrative:
Mr. Fraser. Mr. Secretary, could you give me a single instance
in which this weighing of human rights or shared values or the
lack of them has altered a decision on security assistance or modified the decision? Can you give me a single instance?
Mr. Maw. I have to answer you, Mr. Fraser, by saying that is
one of the factors that has gone in and is weighed in all cases. You
cannot quantify one factor as against another.
Mr. Fraser. Can you point to any country where you can tell us
that weighing in the question of shared values or the lack of it or
the human rightsMr. Maw. I would like not to point the finger at particular
countries but I think you appreciate that we might feel much
more strongly about helping countries if their human rights were
more compatible with our own ideas.
Mr. Fraser. Well, you don't have very much money to work
with.
Mr. Maw. That is correct.
Mr. Fraser. There are some countries that you might do more
for if they had some shared values with us?
Mr. Maw. I prefer not to get into the position of having to point
a finger at any particular countries . . . .

A similar style is evident in the Administration's "Report
135. Hearingson the InternationalSecurity Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act, supra note 79, at 15.
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to the Congress on the Human Rights Situation in Countries
Receiving United States Security Assistance."' 30 The Report
does not mention a single foreign country or a single specific
violation of human rights. Senator Humphrey said of the Report, "It was about as bland, may I say, as swallowing a bucket
of sawdust."'' 7
Congressional unhappiness with the operation of 502B led
to an effort at substantial revision in 1975-76. After President
Ford vetoed S. 2662, which included a lengthy new version of
502B, 3 8 a somewhat different version was included in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976, signed by the President on July 1.111 The new 502B makes
the "increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights" a "principal goal" of United States foreign policy and
declares that no security assistance will be provided to gross
violators of human rights except under specific circumstances
stated in the section. A yearly report to Congress on the human
rights practices of each recipient country is required. Upon the
request of either House or its relevant committee, the Secretary
of State is to transmit, within 30 days, "all the available information" regarding a country's human rights practices, the
steps the United States has taken to discourage human rights
violations and to dissociate itself from such violations, and
"extraordinary circumstances" which "necessitate a continuation of security assistance for such country," a description of
such circumstances, and whether "on all the facts it is in the
national interest of the United States to provide such assistance."'' 0 If a requested statement is not delivered within 30
days, "no security assistance shall be delivered . . . except as
may thereafter be specifically authorized by law."'' After a
136. Report to the Congress on the Human Rights Situation in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, reprintedin 122 CONG. REC. S1895-96 (daily ed. Feb. 18,
1976).
137. 122 CONG. REC. S1895 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
Senator Cranston commented: "This law has been totally ignored." 122 CONG. REc.
S9060 (daily ed. Jun. 11, 1976).
138. S. REP. No. 605, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65 (1976).
139. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat. 748-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974)).
For an exhaustive discussion of section 502B, see Weissbrodt, supra note 125, at 24150.
140. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1) (1976).
141. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(3) (1976).
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requested statement is transmitted, Congress may terminate or

42
restrict security assistance by joint resolution.

The improvements of this section over earlier efforts are
obvious. The provision requires executive reports and information gathering, but moves toward termination of assistance
may be triggered independently by Congress. Unlike the old
502B an executive determination of a violation is not required.
Pressure to label a country as a violator of human rights is thus
removed from the State Department. While a congressional
request would elicit an opinion from the administration as to
whether continued assistance was in the national interest, Congress would also receive facts concerning the human rights violations and the circumstances which "require" continued assistance.4 3 With the facts in hand Congress presumably will be
able to arrive at its own determination of whether security
assistance should be terminated or not. The provision for congressional termination by joint resolution was a change from
the concurrent resolution provision of the vetoed S. 2662, and
was made in the spirit of compromise. As noted above Congress
has long had the power to terminate any foreign assistance by
concurrent resolution, " but, according to Senator Cranston,
that power has never been used.'45
B. The Present Provisions in Practice
A revealing look at section 116 of the Foreign Assistance
Act in practice is provided in recent hearings on the relationship between foreign aid and human rights in Chile." 6 While
Congress had deliberately not placed the burden of determining whether a country had violated human rights on the Executive, that strategy made it difficult to discover exactly what the
State Department's view of human rights in Chile was. An AID
official stated that no determination had been made of whether
Chile violated human rights within the meaning of the statute,
but it was AID's position, in any event, that the assistance was
directly benefitting needy people and was therefore allowable
142. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(4) (1976).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (1976).
144. 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1970).
145. 122 CONG. REC. S9060 (daily ed. June 11, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
146. Chile: The Status of Human Rights and its Relationship to U.S. Economic
Assistance Programs: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations of the
House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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regardless of human rights violations." 7 In fact, the official
asserted, virtually all aid is presently structured so that it benefits needy people.' 8 AID, therefore, was not required to make
any determinations about human rights violations in recipient
countries. If the Executive feels that the aid comes within the
"needy people" proviso, the burden is on Congress to investigate further.
Practice under the new human rights conditions on military aid has been more encouraging.' 9 The State Department
has complied with the new 502B, at least to the extent of compiling reports on human rights violations in countries that received U.S. military aid. Under pressure from several Congressmen, the reports on Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran,
Peru, and the Phillippines were partially declassified in December 1976.150 The reports found varying degrees of violations
of human rights but the State Department concluded that
American military support for each country should continue.' 5 '
Based on these reports, the Carter administration, with some
impetus from Congress, announced cutbacks of assistance to
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay.' 52 However, President
Carter apparently chose to follow the State Department's recommendations regarding countries such as the Philippines,
where U.S. bases might be closed if aid were cut.'55
Of potential significance in future aid decisions, the first
complete State Department report on human rights was sent
to Congress in March 1977 containing information on 82 countries which received security supporting assistance.' While
147. Id. at 20-21.
148. Id. at 24. See also id. at 92-93.
149. Salzberg & Young, supra note 125. But see Note, U.S. Military Exports and
the Arms Export Contol Act of 1976: The F-16 Sale to Iran, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
407 (1977).
150. Human Rights and U.S. Policy: Argen., Haiti,Indonesia,Iran, Peru, and the
Phil., Reports Submitted to the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. By the Dep't of State, H.R.
Doc. No. 462, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See 123 CONG. REc. H452-53 (daily ed. Jan.
19, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Drinen).
151. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
152. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
153. See 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 326 (1977).
154. 1977 Human Rights Reports, prepared by the Dep't of State for the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance, Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). See Weissbrodt, supra note 125, at 263 n.111.
The 1978 report was released in February, and gave information on 105 countries
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not satisfying all critics, the report did bring together data from
the State Department and from various nongovernmental organizations and will provide a basis for later human rights
discussions.
Moreover, it appears that human rights conditions in addition to their "negative" aspects-the cutting of aid-have a
positive impact in the decisionmaking of foreign nations as
well. For example, following the release of the State Department reports and the administration's decisions to reduce aid
to several countries, Indonesia released several thousand alleged communists, some of whom had been detained for up to
ten years. This move was seen as linked to possible cuts in U.S.
55
aid.
The efficacy of these new human rights provisions depends
to a large extent on the policies of the executive branch. The
human rights condition on development assistance allows a
great deal of executive flexibility; aid is always allowed if it
reaches needy people. Conditions on military aid and security
supporting assistance are more tightly drawn, but they too
allow room for maneuvering. As in the Turkish embargo, executive action or inaction may be as important as the statutory
language, and it remains to be seen how closely, within the
statutory parameters, the new administration will link aid to
human rights. The Kissinger policy of nonlinkage meant a
complete separation of human rights concerns from aid decisions, but there are any number of ways short of complete
linkage for President Carter to use foreign military and economic aid to further human rights goals.
VI. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
Insight into the present use of statutory conditions by Congress and the Executive may be gained by a short survey of
developments during 1977. The year was marked by a decided
receiving U.S. aid. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3. While the report notes
some improvement in human rights situations as a result of U.S. efforts, "the overall
picture described for Congress again was a bleak one, with rights reportedly violated
in all but a few non-Western countries." Id. See Human Rights Practicesin Countries
Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, Prepared by the Dep't of State for the House

Comm. on Int'l Rel., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1977).
155. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977, at 27, col. 1. For a listing of favorable acts by
foreign governments in reaction to U.S. human rights initiatives, see Drew, supra note
50, at 59-60. See also, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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shift in the rhetoric of American foreign policy. President
Carter's concern for human rights was stressed early in his
administration and was incorporated into a statement of principles which were to guide American foreign assistance. 5 ' That
statement expressed two occasionally conflicting goals of
Carter's foreign policy. On the one hand, the administration
was "reforming" policies which at times "awarded liberal
grants and loans to repressive regimes which violate human
rights."' 17 On the other hand, the President sought $2.7 billion
for international financial institutions in fiscal year 1978, in
part because "[tihey help remove political considerations
from development efforts, and they encourage developing
countries to pursue sound domestic policies."' 5 8 Thus, at the
same time Carter wanted to use U.S. aid to encourage respect
for human rights and to channel a large amount of aid through
international agencies where control of aid decisions would be
substantially diminished.
This potential conflict surfaced in congressional action on
legislation authorizing increased participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and other multinational
funds." 9 The Senate Committee supported President Carter's
position that human rights provisions in the Statute should
require American representatives to express concern by "vote
and voice" about the human rights records of loans and grant
applicants. The Committee, however, felt strongly "that directives not be issued which would place the U.S. in a position of
a mandated 'no' vote, thus obviating U.S. negotiating strength
and influence in an institution."'' 10
This reaction was in part a response to the apparent ineffectiveness of a condition placed on International Development
Association funding in 1974 which required the American rep156. Message from the President of the United States on ForeignAssistance, H.
Doc. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. H2297 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1977).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Act of Oct. 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 101, 91 Stat. 1067 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 262c (Supp. 1977)).
160. S. REP. No. 159, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977).
For President Carter's views, see his letter to Senator Humphrey, id. at 82-83.
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resentative to vote against loans to countries which had detonated nuclear devices. In practice, that provision had required
the United States to vote against all loans to India. "The effect
of the Long provision had not been to stop India loans, as the
United States does not have veto power, but to negate the
necessity for consultation with the United States about India
loans."' 6' The Senate Committee's broader, nonmandatory
provision on human rights and multinational agencies did not
prevail, however, and the legislation that passed put more restrictions on U.S. aid than the President wanted.
As passed, the statute contains a broad, general statement
that the United States should use its voice and vote to
"advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to
channel assistance toward countries other than those whose
governments engage in [certain violations of human
rights].' '16 In section 701(f), however, the language was more
imperative:
The United States Executive Directors of the institutions listed
in subsection (a) are authorized and instructed to oppose any
loan, any extension of financial assistance, or any technical assistance to any country described in subsection (a)(1) or (2), unless
such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve
the basic human needs of the citizens of such country.113

This section is based on prior statutes such as section 116 of
the Foreign Assistance Act, which allows development aid to
countries where human rights are violated, if that aid goes to
the neediest people. Again, there may be some problems of
interpretation. A new airport or government-built hotel may
not serve "basic human needs," while direct grants of food or
distribution of farming tools presumably would; but there is a
large gray area including dams, rural electrification projects,
and other elements of an economic infrastructure which are
essential to any serious improvement in the well-being of the
population. Section 701(f) also illustrates potential problems
that may result from transfering a condition placed on U.S.
grants of development aid to U.S. participation in an international loan agency. The two types of assistance are structured
161. Id. at 17.
162. Act of Oct. 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 701(a), 91 Stat. 1069 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. 262d (Supp. 1977)).
163. Id. § 701(f), 91 Stat. 1070.
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and operate differently, finance different development projects, and may require conditions more closely tailored to their
respective functions.
A further change in the conditions on multinational appropriations came in section 507 of the Omnibus Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. In an apparent attempt to
strengthen section 701(f), Congress declared that it was the
"sense of the Congress" that where other efforts at promoting
human rights had been ineffective, the U.S. representatives
"should oppose loans" or other financial assistance to countries
which systematically violate human rights."4 However, such
opposition was not required if the President determined that
"the cause of international human rights is served more effectively by actions other than voting against such assistance or
where the assistance is directed to programs that serve the
basic needs of the impoverished majority of the country in
question."'' 5 This section is somewhat difficult to fathom in
that it appears to restate in substantial part section 701(f)
which Congress had enacted less than a month earlier. Although couched in strong and detailed language, it is not mandatory and represents only the sense of Congress. More than
anything else, perhaps, it indicates that Congress would like to
exercise closer control over foreign aid, but that such control
might well be impossible or unwise.
In other areas of human rights legislation, 1977 was a year
for extending some provisions and refining others. For example,
the International Development and Food Assistance Act extended section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act to agriculture
commodity credit sales.' 6 The statute also amended the provision of section 116, as applied to such sales, which allowed sales
to countries which violate human rights if the sales benefit
needy people. The amendment attempts to clarify, though
without a great deal of success, the possible ambiguity in the
meaning of "benefit," and "specifies that the Public Law 480
credit sales will not be deemed to benefit needy people unless
164. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-148, § 507, 91 Stat. 1240 (1977) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 262d-1 (Supp.
1977)).
165. Id.
166. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9588, § 202, 91 Stat. 545 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1711 (Supp. 1977)).
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either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their
sale will be used for specific projects or programs which will
benefit the needy."'' 7 The House Report, however, does add a
helpful gloss on the statute, noting that such projects "should
be mainly in the areas of agricultural development, rural development, nutrition, health services, population planning, food
distribution, education and training, housing, public works,
conservation and storage, and credit and marketing facilities. ' ' 8 Another section of the International Development and
Food Assistance Act contained a small, but possibly significant
authorization of not less than $750,000 for studying and carrying out programs to encourage adherence to political and civil
rights. The House saw this as a positive expression of U.S.
concern for human rights as opposed to the sanctions of actual
69
or threatened reductions of aid.'
More than previous years, the first year of the Carter administration was one of attempting to implement existing
human rights conditions, rather than of enacting sweeping new
legislation. The termination of aid to several countries, based
upon reports prepared pursuant to such legislation, was the
most direct effort by the administration.' 7 0 Perhaps more important in the long run is the currency that the term "human
rights" has gained and the new awareness that those rights are
threatened in many parts of the world. This change in American attitude may have been important, for example, in encouraging the recent general strike in Nicaragua protesting alleged
violations of civil and political rights by the dictatorship of
General Somoza. Although the United States did not actively
support the strikers, the fact that the United States remained
neutral and did not immediately come to the aid of the military
ruler was seen as a major departure from past policy and as
tacit approval of the strike.'7 '
Events of 1977 have also shown that foreign policy achievements such as increased international concern for human rights
can come even in the absence of legislation, when Congress and
167. H.R. REP. No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
168. Id. at 49.
169. Id. at 30-31.
170. See text accompanying note 150 supra. See generally Weissbrodt, supra note
125, at 278-79; Drew, supra note 50, at 59-60.
171. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978, §1, at 3, col. 1.
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the Executive share certain goals. Indeed, during President
Carter's first year Congress repealed two important statutory
directives concerning foreign policy."' Implicit in this was a
recognition that the complexities of foreign policy require at
least some room for Executive discretion and maneuvering. In
a comment that applies to foreign affairs generally, Secretary
of State Vance noted: "In the end, a decision whether and how
to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and
careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an auto1 73
matic answer.'
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

The examples of the Turkish arms embargo and recent
human rights legislation allow some cautious generalizations
about the use of conditions in foreign relations legislation. The
Turkish arms embargo shows the rather blunt operation of legislation directed at a particular country in response to a particular action by that country. This statutory embargo was in part
the result of an absolute statutory condition-that the aggressive use of U.S. arms made the country ineligible for further
aid-and of executive inaction. Whether the embargo was
"right" or "wrong," it is beyond question that it did not allow
room for flexible diplomacy that could have (though not necessarily would have) used the leverage of a threatened arms cutoff to the greatest advantage. Yet, in the circumstances, it may
have been a necessary action to enforce a statutory policy that
the Executive showed little interest in pursuing. 7 4 Occasional
172. Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 702, 91 Stat. 1070, repealed the requirement that the
U.S. representative vote against loans from multinational agencies to countries that
had detonated nuclear devices. See text accompanying note 161 supra. Pub. L. No.
95-88, § 123, 91 Stat. 541, repealed various provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act
which prohibited aid to countries which furnished assistance to Cuba. See H.R. REP.
No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977).
173. Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 223, 226
(1977).
174. As Representative Fraser, one of the major backers of human rights legislation, has written:
In recent years Congress has struggled with a recalcitrant executive
branch over [the issue of human rights]. When the executive branch
failed to implement the legislative mandate on human rights the only
recourse open to Congress was to act in specific situations. Congress will
welcome a clear declaration of intent by the executive branch to stress
human rights in its foreign policies, and will be ready to accept quiet
diplomacy as the most effective way to give expression to the deep-seated
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congressional action such as the Turkish embargo may be necessary to put both the Executive and foreign countries on notice that conditions on aid will be enforced. If a statutory condition is to be effective, the sanctions for violation must be credible. However, frequent use of absolute conditions on aid may
force Congress into other situations where its flexibility is limited.
To be truly influential, Congress must move beyond the
simple "yes/no" character of an embargo and devise legislation that meets the complexity of foreign policy. The new
human rights conditions seem to be an attempt to do just that.
This succession of statutes has led to one provision, section
502B, which does appear to be effective in requiring the State
Department to compile reports on human rights violations in
countries which receive military assistance and to make recommendations for aid decisions. In late 1976, for example, Congress was instrumental in getting several such reports released,
and the Executive subsequently reduced aid to three countries.
Even if the administration had not acted, Congress would have
had before it the information on human rights violations and
on the security or other reasons for not terminating aid, and
Congress would have been able to act on its own to reduce or
terminate aid.
Recalling the guidelines for legislative conditions suggested at the beginning of this article,'7 5 a strong argument can
be made that Congress has done all it should by way of a
general statutory framework in the area of human rights and
military aid:
1. It has introduced a new consideration into foreign
military aid decisions;
2. It has required the Executive to gather necessary
information and transmit it to Congress;
3. It has equipped itself with a means of reviewing
administration action and modifying by legislation
when necessary.
desire of the American people that their government be devoted to furthering decency in the conduct of human affairs.
Fraser, supra note 125, at 156.
175. See text following note 10 supra.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 7:197

Congress can of course engage in various other kinds of
human rights activism, such as publicizing violations through
hearings. But if Congress regularly goes beyond these functions, making absolute conditions a large part of foreign aid
legislation and passing special statutes to deal with a multitude of discrete and transitory foreign relations matters, there
will doubtless be more cases like the Turkish embargo.
When the human rights views of Congress and the Executive are in harmony, of course, defects in the statutory language
will not be as apparent; the Executive will not (presumably)
try to evade the legislative mandate by strained interpretations
of the law. It is possible, however, that in such a situation
congressional attentiveness to human rights will atrophy, and
its oversight role under the new legislation go unfulfilled. If
Congress is to play the more vital role in foreign policy that it
has created for itself, it must continue to be involved in the
process even when the glamour has faded. The present 502B
provides a workable framework for considering human rights
within the context of military aid; it is now up to Congress to
make that mechanism work.
Congressional involvement in foreign assistance will bring
it face to face with the hard questions of foreign policy. Aid is
one area where the Constitution gives Congress almost complete control over policy issues normally reserved to the President. There, it can attach the conditions it wishes and encourage or discourage practices it chooses. In its recent human
rights legislation, Congress has begun to arm itself with needed
information and to infuse human rights considerations into
executive policymaking. In this fashion it has started to exert
its influence in these difficult decisions. Congress can take
credit when U.S. actions advance human rights and international peace and must accept part of the blame when policies
fail.

